The wage paid to elected officials affects both the self-selection of citizens willing to run for office and the performance of those who are appointed. On one side, if skilled individuals shy away from politics because of higher opportunities in the private sector, an increase in politicians' pay might change their mind. On the other side, if the reelection prospects of incumbents depend on their in-office deeds, a higher wage might foster performance. In this paper, we use data on all Italian municipalities from 1993 to 2005 and test these hypotheses in a quasi-experimental framework. In Italy, the wage of the mayor depends on population size and sharply changes at different thresholds. We apply a regression discontinuity design on the only threshold that uniquely identifies a wage change (1,000 inhabitants) to control for unobservable town characteristics. The empirical results show that a higher wage attracts more educated candidates, more entrepreneurs and self-employed, but less white and blue collars. At the same time, better-paid politicians are able to raise more external funds, reduce taxes, cut deficit, and increase investments. Exploiting the existence of a two-term limit, we further disentangle the selection from the incentive component of the performance effect, and find that most of it is driven by the higher quality of the elected mayors, rather than by the incentive to be reelected.
Introduction
Paying politicians is a debated but elusive topic. Firms set the wage of workers to maximize their profits; politicians set the wage of bureaucrats to maximize either social welfare or their own interests. For the same reason, citizens-the principal-should transparently set the optimal compensation of politicians-the agent-according to some welfare criterion.
But this is rarely the case. The wage of elected officials is decided (or follows rules decided by) politicians themselves. Public opinion swings from the complaint against the high salaries of the political elite, claiming that public-spirited officials should not be paid, to the acknowledgment that "if you pay peanuts you get monkeys" also in politics. No evidence unambiguously supports either claim.
In economics, it has long been recognized that politicians respond to incentives like all other agents, and that those incentives are a crucial determinant of economic outcomes (e.g., Brennan and Buchanan, 1980) . Recent contributions also point to the importance of political selection on economic outcomes, for politicians may be heterogeneous in their competence and honesty (e.g., Besley, 2005) . The wage paid to elected officials is an important element in shaping both their decision to self-select into politics and their in-office behaviors. According to the efficiency wage theory, a high wage could both attract more skilled candidates (that is, citizens with higher opportunity costs) and enhance performance (because of the higher cost of not being reelected). Although the efficiency wage theory leaves aside many elements that are peculiar to the labor market for politicians, influential models in political economics contain similar intuitions and predictions while adding more structure on the political side (e.g., Besley, 2004) . There are other models, however, that lead to the opposite conclusion, that is, paying politicians more decreases their average quality (e.g., Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008) .
1 Therefore, the question whether politicians' salary affects selection and performance is ultimately empirical.
Despite important exceptions (Ferraz and Finan, 2008) , there is no strong causal evidence on the impact of politicians' wage. In this paper, we use a data set on the mayors of all Italian municipalities from 1993 to 2005 to evaluate the wage effects in a quasiexperimental framework. In particular, we test whether a higher wage attracts candidates with higher opportunity costs (selection effect) and improve the performance of elected officials (performance effect). Lastly, we investigate whether the performance effect-if 1 See Section 2 for a full discussion.
2 Related literature
Theoretical background
According to the efficiency wage theory, workers' productivity is increasing in the real wage they are paid.
2 There are three main explanations for why this relationship should hold:
paying workers more reduces shirking because of the higher cost of being fired (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) ; it enhances the quality of the applicants (Weiss, 1980) ; and it improves motivation and group work norms (Akerlof, 1982) . If we apply these insights to the market for politicians, we should conclude that a higher wage is likely to improve the performance of elected officials due to different reasons. First, a higher wage will attract more skilled individuals (that is, citizens with better outside opportunities in the private sector) into politics. Second, it will increase the incumbent's incentive for being reelected; and this, in turn, will make elected officials more disciplined (e.g., less inclined to extract rents).
Third, it could improve the morale of politicians.
The efficiency wage perspective leaves aside many elements that are peculiar to the labor market for politicians, such as party selection, campaigning, and voters' preferences.
Influential models in political economics, however, contain some intuitions and predictions of the efficiency wage hypothesis while adding more structure on the political side. Besley (2004) builds an agency model with both unobserved heterogeneity in the congruence of politicians with voters (adverse selection) and unobserved action when in office (moral hazard). On the one hand, as reelection is the main incentive mechanism, a higher wage plays a discipline role, that is, it increases performance by forcing dissonant politicians to extract lower rents. On the other hand, a higher wage also increases the fraction of congruent politicians, who-unlike the dissonant type-earn no rents from entering politics. Caselli and Morelli (2004) present an adverse selection model where low-quality citizens ("bad politicians") have a comparative advantage in holding office, because their market wages are lower than those of more competent individuals, or because they extract more rents than more honest individuals. In this framework, a higher salary raises the average quality of the (self-selected) pool of politicians. Finally, Persson and Tabellini (2000) propose a career-concern model where forward-looking voters use past performance to estimate the ability of the incumbent. As a result, also low-ability officials have an incentive to cut rents and increase the political output in order to be reelected. Because the reelection incentive also depends on the remuneration package, the higher the wage, the lower politicians' rents and the higher performance.
The prediction that the quality of politicians is increasing in their wage, however, is not unambiguous in political economics. Actually, a number of models suggest that-under specific circumstances-the opposite may be true. Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) propose a dynamic model where there are both "career politicians" (who stay in politics until retirement) and individuals with "political careers" (who stay in politics for a while in order to signal their true ability to the private sector). In this framework, a wage increase lowers the average quality of citizens who become politicians (entry effect), and it has an ambiguous effect on the average quality of career politicians, because more high-ability incumbents are willing to remain in politics (retention effect). Poutvaara and Takalo (2007) , in a model with primaries and campaigning costs, show that, when campaigning costs are sufficiently high, increasing the wage may lower the quality of the average candidate. Messner and Polborn (2004) come to a similar conclusion, although in their case the rationale for negative sorting is that high-quality citizens free-ride on low-quality ones, under the assumption that the attractiveness of public life is low. Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2008) study the effect of outside income on political selection: in their framework, when outside income induces equilibria with positive sorting, a wage increase attracts citizens with relatively lower competence into politics. Finally, Besley (2005) introduces another argument that may explain a negative impact of the wage on politicians' quality: if public service motivations are strong, increasing remuneration lowers the relative attractiveness of politics for public-spirited citizens.
Empirical studies
Despite this rich set of theoretical contributions, there are only a few empirical studies on the impact of politicians' remuneration. Di Tella and Fisman (2004) look at gubernatorial pay in the US from 1950 to 1990 and find that the wages respond to changes in state income per capita and taxes. In particular, governors obtain a one percent pay cut for each ten percent increase in per capita taxation, and there is evidence that this negative tax elasticity is an implicit form of performance pay. Besley (2004) analyzes the same data on US gubernatorial pay. He finds that the congruence between the ideological positions of the governor and the citizens-as measured by established surveys-is posi-tively associated with the governor's wage. Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005) estimate a structural dynamic model of congressional careers in the US, finding that congressional experience significantly increases post-congressional wages in the private sector. Keane and Merlo (2007) use the same model to evaluate the effect of reducing the relative wage of congressmen. They find that a wage reduction would induce more "skilled" politicians to exit Congress (where skills refer to the ability to win elections), but this is not true for "achievers", that is, those who perform better in terms of legislative and policy goals.
An empirical exercise similar to ours was presented, independently, by Ferraz and Finan (2008) . To the best of our knowledge, this is the only other paper that uses an exogenous source of variation in the wage to identify its causal effect on political selection and the performance of elected officials. They implement an RDD exploiting a Brazilian constitutional amendment that introduced caps on the wages of local politicians according to population size. They show that a higher wage attracts more candidates and, in particular, more educated ones; and they find that legislative productivity-measured as the number of bills submitted and approved-increases with the salary. Despite the similarity between the two approaches, however, our paper is distinct in many respects. First, we implement a sharp (instead of a fuzzy) RDD, because in Italy it is the statutory wage, and not a cap, that varies with population size. Second, we focus on the mayor as the chief executive of the municipality, instead of legislators, and we then use a set of budget indicators as performance outcomes. Third-and most important-we are able to disentangle between the selection and the incentive effect of the wage on performance, exploiting the existence of a two-term limit for Italian mayors.
To a lower extent, our paper also relates to other strands of the political economics literature. Some recent studies have implemented RDD exercises based on policies that vary with population size at the local level, in order to estimate the effect of political parties on economic outcomes (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2008; Petterson-Lindbom, 2008a) or the effect of the number of legislators on the size of government (Petterson-Lindbom, 2008b) . Our results could also be compared with studies that investigate the effect of pay in the civil service on corruption (Besley and McLaren, 1993; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001 ), although we look at elected officials and our focus is more on performance and administrative IQ rather than honesty. Finally, as we make the assumption that a binding term limit wipes out the incentive for reelection (see next section), our framework borrows insights from the vast literature on term limits and political accountability. In this section, we formalize the evaluation framework that allows us to identify the effect of the wage on both political selection and the in-office performance of elected officials.
The theoretical background is the efficiency wage theory and the political economics literature reviewed in the previous section. In particular, we want to assess whether the simple efficiency-wage predictions-as opposed to some of the different views on paying politicians voiced in political economics-have an empirical counterpart in the labor market for politicians.
To be more precise, we want to test the following hypotheses.
(H1) A higher wage attracts more citizens with high opportunity costs into politics, that is, more skilled individuals with lofty alternative remunerations in the private sector (effect of the wage on political selection).
(H2) A higher wage enhances the performance of elected officials (effect of the wage on performance). This may in turn be determined by two different channels:
(H2.1) a higher wage attracts more skilled individuals into politics (selection effect of the wage on performance); (H2.2) a higher wage increases the cost of not being reelected (incentive effect of the wage on performance).
We disregard the pure motivational effect of the wage on performance, because it cannot be disentangled from the data. Note, however, that its direction is very unclear from a theoretical point of view (see Section 2). In the following, we show how to test (H1) and (H2), and disentangle (H2.1) from (H2.2).
A major difficulty in identifying the effect of politicians' remuneration on their selection and performance is the absence of a truly exogenous variation in the way they are paid.
On the one hand, by comparing remunerations across countries-or across regions and cities within the same country-a number of place-specific characteristics may confound the effect of the wage. On the other hand, remuneration changes across time may be endogenously associated with both political selection and the behaviors of elected officials.
To overcome this problem, we exploit the source of (local) exogenous variation arising from the Italian policy of paying mayors according to the population size of their city.
Define X i as the characteristics of both the mayor and the citizens who run for mayor in town i; Y i as some performance indicator for the mayor; P i as population size; and W i as the wage paid to the mayor. By law, the wage sharply increases at the population threshold
To express the fact that both the characteristics of the political elite and the performance of the mayor depend on the wage, we use a potential outcome framework. Define X i (W k ) ≡ X ik , with k ∈ {l, h}, as the potential characteristics of politicians in town i if the wage were equal For instance, high-quality politicians may be able to obtain higher wages (see Di Tella and Fisman, 2004) . The fact that in Italy remuneration depends on population size, however, can be exploited to implement a sharp RDD and estimate the causal effect of the wage on X and Y . We simply have to make the following assumptions.
In other words, the potential characteristics of the political elite and the potential performance of the mayor, which may depend on the population size P , should not display any discontinuity at P c . Although both assumptions are more than plausible in our setting, two caveats are in order. First, if mayors can manipulate population size and sort above the threshold, treatment assignment is no longer exogenous. Second, if there is another policy that depends on population size and shares the same threshold P c , the effect of the wage is confounded with the effect of this other policy and cannot be identified. It is thus important to check whether the data provide evidence of sorting around the threshold, and to be sure that other policies do not use the same population threshold.
Under Assumption 1, it is straightforward to show that E[X l |P = P c ] = lim P ↑Pc X and E[X h |P = P c ] = lim P ↓Pc X. We can thus identify the treatment effect of the wage on political selection as:
Similarly, under Assumption 2, we can show that
, so as to identify the treatment effect of the wage on performance:
Both τ sel and τ per are defined as local effects, because they capture the impact of the wage only for towns around the threshold P c . As usual in RDD, the gain in internal validity comes at the price of lower external validity.
Disentangling incentives from selection
To empirically disentangle (H2.1) and (H2.2) as alternative explanations of the impact of the wage on politicians' performance, we need to introduce further notation and assumptions. Rewrite potential performance as: respect to citizens attracted to politics by W l . Based on this formulation, the effect of the wage on performance can be decomposed as τ per = σ per + φ per , where:
To identify these average treatment effects, we exploit an additional feature of the Italian institutional framework. Because of a term limit, mayors cannot spend more than two consecutive terms in office. This implies that, for mayors at the second term, reelection is no longer a feasible goal. We can thus introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 3 The incentive effect of the wage on performance is at work only when the term limit is not binding (reelection motive).
This does not mean that mayors at the second term have no incentives to perform well. They may still want to do their best because they plan to run for higher offices;
because they want to be remembered for their positive legacy; or simply because of intrinsic motivations. The crucial point is that all of these incentives do not depend on the wage, because reelection as a mayor is no longer included in the opportunity set.
If T is the number of previous consecutive terms, at T = 0 the term limit constraint is slack, while at T = 1 it is binding. Potential outcomes now depend not only on W but also on T : Y kj , with k ∈ {l, h} and j ∈ {0, 1}. And, under Assumption 3, they can be summarized as follows.
Here, exp stands for administrative experience and we are assuming that its effect on performance is independent of the wage schedule. The above table shows that the skills of politicians are different, if we compare mayors in their first term with mayors who have already been reelected once. In particular, as long as performance is relevant for reelection, we expect mayors at T = 1 to be more skilled according to both observable and unobservable characteristics. In general: S(X k0 ) = S(X k1 ) and v k0 = v k1 , with k ∈ {l, h}.
If we restrict the analysis to a sample of politicians elected for two consecutive terms, however, we observe the same guys at both T = 0 and T = 1. In such a restricted sample, we have that indeed:
In this context, we can identify the overall effect of the wage on performance as:
where the first equality follows from Assumption 3 and the fact that we are only dealing with two-term politicians, while the second equality follows from Assumption 2.
Similarly, we can identify the selection effect and the incentive effect of the wage on performance, respectively, as:
Again, in both equations, the first equality follows from Assumption 3 and the sample restriction to two-term politicians, while the second equality follows from Assumption 2.
Estimation and validity tests
In order to test (H1), (H2), (H2.1), and (H2.2), we need to implement equations (1), (3), (4), and (5) and Lemieux (2008) . This method restricts the estimation to a compact support, and fits linear regression functions to the observations distributed within a distance h on either side of the threshold. In other words, to implement equation (1), we restrict the sample to towns in the interval P i ∈ [P c − h, P c + h] and estimate the model:
where X i captures some observable trait of the mayor or the candidates, D i is a dummy equal to one if P i ≥ P c (treatment), and the normalized variable P * i = P i − P c allows us to interpret δ 2 as the jump between the two regression lines at the threshold P c (i.e., at P * i = 0). As a result: τ sel = δ 2 . We select the bandwidth h in two ways: applying the cross-validation method proposed by Ludwig and Miller (2007) and formalized by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) ; choosing the maximum symmetric bandwidth forced by the fact that there are different policy thresholds below or above P c and we do not want our sample to cross these other thresholds.
5 As the same city is observed in different mayoral terms, we control for intra-city correlation in the error term η i .
In a similar way, to implement equations (3), (4), and (5), we fit two different linear regression functions on both sides of the threshold P c : one for politicians without a binding term limit (T = 0) and one for politicians with a binding term limit (T = 1). The jump in the regression lines for the subsample T = 0 can be interpreted as an estimate of τ per , while the jump in the regression lines for the subsample T = 1 can be seen as an estimate of σ per . The difference between the two jumps produces an estimate of φ per . Formally, we define S i as a dummy equal to one if the term limit constraint is slack (T = 0) and equal to zero if the term limit is binding (T = 1). We then restrict the sample to cities in the interval P i ∈ [P c − h, P c + h] and estimate the model:
where Y i is some performance indicator for the mayor, D i the treatment, and P * i the normalized population size. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. It is straightforward to show that the overall effect of the wage on performance is τ per = δ 2 + δ 6 (when S i = 1), while the selection effect on performance is σ per = δ 2 (when S i = 0). It follows that the incentive effect on performance is φ per = δ 6 .
A number of additional tests can evaluate the validity of the RDD assumptions and the robustness of the results. First, to check for the absence of manipulation of the running variable P around the threshold (violated if mayors were able to affect population size and sort above P c ), we can test the null hypothesis of continuity of the density of P at P c as proposed by McCrary (2008) . Second, as treatment assignment should be as good as random at the threshold, we can check the balancing of invariant city characteristics (such as area size and geographical location) just below and above the threshold: that is, predetermined variables should display no discontinuity at P c . A last set of robustness checks involve estimating jumps at points where there should be no jumps. Specifically, 5 The cross-validation method consists in choosing h so as to minimize the loss function:
where the predictionsμ h (P i ) are retrieved as follows. For every P i to the left (right) of the threshold P c , we predict the value of X as if it were at the boundary of the estimation, using only observations in the interval
. Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we calculate the loss function on a subsample of politicians, discarding 50% of the observations on either side of the threshold P c .
we perform placebo RDD estimations for the outcome variables at fake discontinuities on either side of the threshold, expecting to detect zero treatment effects.
Data 4.1 Institutional framework
The Italian municipal government (Comune) is headed by a Mayor (Sindaco), who appoints an Executive Committee (Giunta). They are assisted by a Council (Consiglio Comunale), which is the legislative authority. In 1993, the mayoral electoral system was changed from party ballot to mayor ballot, with some differences depending on the size of the city as measured in the last available population census. If the population size is smaller than 15,000 inhabitants, elections are held with single ballot and plurality rule, and the winning candidate is awarded a majority premium of at least two-thirds of the seats in the council. In municipalities with population above 15,000, elections are held with dual ballot (where the second is held only if none of the candidates in the first ballot obtained the absolute majority of the votes), and the winning candidate is awarded a majority premium of at least 60 percent of the seats in the council. Mayors are subject to a two-term limit, unless one of the two terms lasted for less than two years. In 2000, the statutory duration of the legislature was extended from four to five years.
The compensation of a mayor depends on the size of the resident population in the municipal area. As of 2000, the wage starts from 1,291 euros per month for municipalities with less than 1,000 inhabitants up to 7,798 euros for those with more than 1,000,000
people. The salary is updated every three years to the CPI, as measured by the National Statistical Office, and the Giunta can introduce an additional 15% increase. The deputy mayor and the members of the executive committee receive a salary in a proportion of the mayor's, while councillors are paid a fee for each session. In case the mayor, the deputy mayor, or the members of the executive committee work as employees, the salary is cut by half, unless they are on leave for the duration of the mandate. Along with the salary, the population size also determines the size of the council (varying from 12 to 60), and whether or not a municipality is constrained by the Internal Stability Pact, which is a set of measures introduced in 1999 and intended to restrain local public expenditure.
In Table 1 , we present a summary of all the policies varying with population size. Only two out of these thresholds (namely, 1,000 and 50,000) determine a variation solely in the compensation of the mayor. In all the other cases, in fact, the wage policy overlaps with either the council size or the Internal Stability Pact.
Sample selection and variables of interest
The original data set contains all the mayoral terms elected from 1985 to 2007. It carries information about gender, age, highest educational attainment, political affiliation, and previous job of the elected mayor, all the losing mayoral candidates, the members of the executive committee, and the members of the council. From 1993, it also provides yearly information at the municipality level about the size of the resident population, the budget, plus some financial and administrative indicators.
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We first dropped all mayoral terms started before 1993 because we lack the budget information for those years, and also because the pre-electoral reform political system was a different ball game. In particular, the post-1993 Italian mayors fit particularly well with Besley's (2004, p.210) recommendation that agency models on paying politicians "are most promising when applied in situations where there are directly elected chief executives with significant discretionary power." In addition, we dropped all the municipalities belonging to regions with special autonomy (Regioni Autonome a Statuto Speciale), namely Sicily, Val D'Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia and Sardinia, which had a special legislation both for the electoral and the salary regulation. As we can see in Table 2 , we end up with a sample of 6,671 municipalities for a total of 21,507 terms. Not surprisingly, the territory is very fragmented, with the majority of the municipalities (about 32.33%) having a population between 1,000 and 3,000, or below 1,000 (23.69%). It is also worth noticing that no much changed in the population distribution with the 2001 Census update, except for a small decrease in the number of municipalities with less than 3,000 inhabitants.
In Table 3 , we describe the characteristics of both the pool of candidates and the elected mayor by population size. On average, 8% of the mayors are women, aged 47, with almost 14 years of schooling. Almost 13% were not employed (either unemployed or out of the labor force) before being appointed, while 47% were occupied as self-employed, professionals, or entrepreneurs, and 35% as blue or white collars, with other types of occupation in the residual category. As far as the population size increases, mayors are more educated, less likely to be non-employed, white-collar, or blue-collar, and more likely 6 The individual-level data were provided by the Statistical Office of the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs, while all the town-level data by ANCI (Associazione Nazionale Comuni Italiani).
to be entrepreneurs, professionals, or self-employed.
As budget indicators we use the following variables in per capita terms: deficit, total revenues, and total expenditure. To assess budget management and priorities, we also look at the following ratios: external transfers, tax revenues, or other own revenues as a fraction of total revenues; personnel costs as a fraction of total expenditure; and the ratio between capital and current expenditure, which is a relative measure of municipal investments.
In order to identify what the mayor has achieved during his or her mandate, instead of capturing some resilience from the previous terms, all the variables refer to the last year in office, excluding the election year. Table 4 contains some descriptive statistics of these budget indicators. On average, total revenues are 1,367 euros per capita, while expenditure is 1,390. Both revenues and expenditure decrease with the size of the population, with the only exception being the cities above 100,000. Accordingly, the average deficit amounts to 22.44 euros per capita. When we look more deeply at the composition of revenues and expenditures, we can see that most of the revenues are made of transfers from the government, the regional authority, or the European Union (62%), while 26% are local taxes. A 28% of the expenditure is used to cover personnel costs, which are decreasing with the size of the municipality. Finally, for each euro of current expenditure, there are 85 cents spent in long-run investments.
Econometric results
In this section, we present the results of the estimation strategy outlined in Section 3.
Following the previous discussion, only the 1,000 and the 50,000 thresholds uniquely determine the compensation of the mayor, while all of the other thresholds overlap with at least another policy. Because of the very small sample size around 50,000 inhabitants, we further decided to focus on the 1,000 threshold only.
Testing for nonrandom sorting above the threshold
We assess the validity of our evaluation strategy with two different testing procedures.
First, we investigate the smoothness of the running variable (i.e, population size) around the 1,000 threshold. Second, we check whether all of the pre-treatment covariates are balanced in the neighborhood of the threshold.
In Figure 1 , we plot the frequency of municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants, using different binsizes (100, 250, and 500 inhabitants). 7 We can see that the distribution is positively skewed, with a pick around 700. Visual inspection does not reveal any clear discontinuity around the 1,000 and 5,000 thresholds, although the same is not true for the other thresholds (3,000, 10,000, and 15,000), where it seems that cities managed to sort just above the policy cutoff. Although the census is run independently by the National Statistical Office, so that false reporting should be avoided, it could still be the case that municipalities succeed in sorting above the thresholds by attracting citizens to their territory from other towns (e.g., by means of tax rebates for owners who acquire official residence in the municipality). For this reason, in Figure 2 , we investigate more deeply the shape of the running variable around the 1,000 threshold, which is the crucial treatment assignment mechanism in our evaluation exercise. Some variability can be detected, but this seems to be noise rather than manipulative sorting. We formally test for the presence of a density discontinuity in Figure 3 , where a McCrary test is performed by running kernel local linear regressions of the log of the density separately on both sides of the threshold (McCrary, 2008). As we can see from the figure, the log-difference between the frequency to the right and to the left of the 1,000 threshold is negative (-0.1062) but not statistically significant (the standard error of the test being 0.0698).
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We are aware that a density test may have low power if manipulation has occurred on both sides of the threshold. In this case the monotonicity assumption does not hold, and there might be nonrandom sorting around the threshold although this would not be detected in the distribution of the running variable. However, we do not know of any reason why mayors may have the interest to sort just below 1,000. The evidence of no sorting above 1,000 is thus reassuring. On the contrary, for the other thresholds, we might expect a broader interest for twisting the population size as much as the policy concerns the whole political elite of the community, instead of just the mayor. Not surprisingly, Figure 3 highlights some manipulation at the 3,000 and 15,000 thresholds, where local politicians may have coordinated their efforts to attract new residents, in order to increase the size of the legislative body or change the electoral rule.
In Table 5 , we further check for manipulative sorting above 1,000 by performing balance tests on the available pre-treatment characteristics. If there were nonrandom sorting, we should expect some of these characteristics to differ systematically between treated and untreated municipalities. The only available pre-treatment characteristics are the size of the geographical area and the location, since all the rest is not predetermined.
The balance tests are performed using the same procedure of the McCrary test, with separate kernel local linear regressions on both sides of the discontinuity point. 9 No pretreatment characteristics show a significant discontinuity at the threshold. In particular, the geographical location, which could be correlated with the main unobservable element we cannot control for, that is, the administrative culture and ability, is also balanced.
From the McCrary and the balance tests, we confidently conclude that, at least around 1,000 inhabitants, being below or above the threshold is purely random.
The effect of the wage on selection
In this section, we analyze whether paying politicians more affects political selection.
First, in Table 6 , we look at whether a higher expected remuneration has an effect on the quality of those who run for the mayoral office. Specifically, we look at the characteristics of the first three candidates (including the one who is then elected) and estimate equation (6) with local linear regression. 10 We can see that the 12% wage increase at the 1,000
threshold attracts on average more educated people (0.297 years of schooling more) and more self-employed, professionals, or entrepreneurs (by 3.7 percentage points). Conversely, it reduces the probability that white and blue collars participate in the electoral race by 4.3 percentage points. Stronger results hold when we restrict the estimation to the optimal bandwidth interval: 0.511 years of schooling more; 5.5 percentage-point increase in the fraction of entrepreneurs, professionals, or self-employed; and 4.8 percentage-point reduction in the fraction of withe or blue collars. In particular, the impact on the previous job is sizable, as it amounts to an increase of about 15% for higher occupations and to a reduction of about 11% for lower occupations (with respect to the below-2,000 average values of 0.37 and 0.40, respectively). No effect is detected on other characteristics like gender, age, and not being employed before entering politics. Note also the similarity with the plots in Figure 4 , where we draw scatters of the observed values, plus a running-mean smoothing performed separately on either side of the threshold.
Not surprisingly, attracting better candidates helps appointing better mayors. Everything else equal, elected officials who are better paid are more likely to be entrepreneurs, professionals, or self-employed (by 8.2 or 8.6 percentage points according to the preferred bandwidth), and they are less likely to be white or blue collars (by 7.1 percentage points with the optimal bandwidth). These effects, again, are sizable if compared to the below-2,000 average values of 0.39 for the former occupational type and 0.40 for the latter. The significance of the effect on education, however, disappears. A higher wage attracts more educated candidates, but it turns out that they are not elected. This apparent puzzle could be explained by the fact that education affects the market wage (which represents the opportunity cost of running for office), but it is not perceived by voters as a good proxy of political skills. The above effects can be visually inspected in Figure 5 , where we draw scatters of the observed values, plus a running-mean smoothing performed separately on either side of the threshold.
The effect of the wage on performance: disentangling incentives from selection
In this section, we turn to analyze whether the remuneration of the mayor affects the way he or she administrates the municipality. As outlined in Section 3, we estimate equation (7) to retrieve both the overall effect of the wage on performance (identified on mayors with a slack term limit) and the selection effect of the wage on performance (identified on mayors with a binding term limit), recovering at the same time the incentive effect as the difference between the two. In what follows, we will mainly refer to the results with an optimally chosen bandwidth. The fact that we find very similar results when using a maximum symmetric bandwidth is a robustness exercise that our estimates are not too sensitive to the choice of the bandwidth, and that almost all the variables of interest have a linear and well-behaved shape along the population size. This can also be checked in Figure 6 , where we plot the usual scatters and running-mean smoothing.
The first result to notice in Table 7 is that paying a mayor 12% more increases the composition of the collected revenues. The percentage of transfers from other national or European institutions rises in fact by 5.4 percentage points (+8% with respect to a below-2,000 average of 0.67), while the amount of tax revenues decreases by 6.5 percentage points (-30% with respect to a below-2,000 average of 0.22). In a sense, better paid mayors are better at attracting external funds, thus reducing the need for taxes. This also allows them to increase the municipal expenditure by 207.69 euros per capita. 11 The overall effect on the deficit is insignificant, and the composition of expenditure does not seem to vary.
Looking at the other estimates in Table 7 , it is clear though that most of the overall effect comes from the selection of good politicians, rather than from the interaction between a high wage and the willingness to be reelected. As a matter of fact, the incentive effect is almost always insignificant, or it is working in the opposite direction of the selection effect. Among mayors with a binding term limit (selection effect), those who are paid more increases the share of transfers by 4.5 percentage points and reduces the taxes by 4.2 percentage points. And, interestingly, they also cut the deficit by 23.48 euros (a sizable amount if we consider that the average deficit is 27.37 euros below 2,000 inhabitants) and raises the ratio of capital over current expenditure by 0.524 (+48% with respect to a below-2,000 average of 1.085). Personnel expenses are unaffected also in this case.
If we just look at the selection component of the story, better-paid politicians are able to raise more external funds for their municipality, reduce taxes on their citizens, run lower deficits, and invest more on the future by increasing capital outlays at the expense of current outlays. If we look at the overall effect, however, we see that some of these results are lowered or even wiped out by the reelection incentive. For instance, betterpaid politicians cut deficit and enhance investments in their second mandate, but not in their first mandate, when deficit and current expenditures can be used as a leverage to gain reelection. If one attaches a positive value to low deficits and high investments, electoral accountability comes with the price of politicians' "pandering" to voters (Maskin and Tirole, 2004) . But this does not alter the sizable (and statistically significant) selection effect of the wage on performance.
We are aware that some of our results may be country specific. If Italian voters were strongly ideological, mayors would not face the threat of not being reelected and would be voted independently of their performance. This might also explain why a higher wage does not work as an incentive for performing better. It is commonly believed, however, that the direct election of mayors introduced in 1993 in Italy put these politicians on the spotlight, and that this considerably enhanced the monitoring by voters.
Robustness exercises
In what follows, we perform some additional robustness exercises to assess the validity of the previous results. In Tables 8 and 9 , we include in the estimation the available predetermined variables (i.e., geographical size and location) as covariates. If these variables were balanced around the threshold, estimates would be insensitive to their inclusion. As we can see, these estimates are almost identical to the ones presented in Table 6 for political selection, and in Table 7 for the budget indicators, both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance.
In the framework outlined in Section 3, all mayors without a binding term limit were at their first mandate, while all mayors with a binding term limit were at their second mandate. When the term limit was introduced, however, it became binding only for those mayors with two consecutive terms starting after 1993, no matter the number of terms they have been in office before. For this reason, in our sample there are some mayors in their third or fourth term who could still be reelected, and their different administrative experience could interact with the estimated effects. In Table 10 we present the same estimates as in Table 7 restricting the sample to mayors elected for their first term after 1993. We can see that the estimates are almost unchanged, no matter whether we used an optimal or a maximum bandwidth. We therefore conclude that differences in experience do not bias our results.
Finally, in Tables 11 and 12 , we implement placebo tests by estimating the treatment effect at fake thresholds, where there should be no effect. In particular, we look at points which are close to the true threshold, i.e., one quartile below and one quartile above on either side of the 1,000 threshold. We then estimate the treatment effect on several variables using the maximum available symmetric bandwidth. With very few exceptions, the jumps at these fake thresholds are never statistically significant.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that paying mayors more has a positive effect on the quality of elected politicians, and improves the way they administer public finance. In particular, better-paid politicians are able to raise more external funds, reduce taxes for their citizens, cut deficit, and increase investments with respect to current expenditure. Results also show that most of the performance effect is driven by the higher quality of the elected mayors, rather than by the incentive to be reelected. In the case of deficit and capital over current expenditure, the reelection incentive even works in the opposite direction of selection.
Of course, our empirical exercise cannot help determining the optimal wage level, that is, it cannot say which is the upper limit over which the welfare benefit from paying politicians more is zero or offset by the wage itself. Still, it makes clear that remuneration is a relevant motivation for citizens to run for elective office, not just pro-social interests.
While the obvious recommendation would be to increase the salary paid to elected officials, our exercise also suggests that, in addition to the population size, the salary could also be linked to the wages in the private sector for similar occupations, like for example CEO's or other professionals. By doing so, voters would effectively compete with firms in recruiting the brightest citizens for elective offices, and the complaints about the wage of elected officials being decided by politicians themselves would be mitigated. 
Tables and Figures
Population is the number of resident inhabitants, as measured by the Census. Population size is the number of resident inhabitants, as measured by the Census. All variables refer to the last pre-election year in office. Population size is the number of resident inhabitants, as measured by the Census. Population size is the number of resident inhabitants, as measured by the Census. Mayors observed for two terms, with the term-limit binding in the second. Population size is the number of resident inhabitants, as measured by the Census. Mayors observed for two terms, with the term-limit binding in the second. The covariates are: geographical size, two macro-region dummies. Population size is the number of resident inhabitants, as measured by the Census. We also included the geographical size, and two macro-region dummies. Mayors observed for two terms, with the term-limit binding in the second. Population size is the number of resident inhabitants, as measured by the Census. Mayors observed for two terms, with the term-limit binding in the second. Mayors observed for two terms, with the term-limit binding in the second. The solid line is a running-mean smoothing with a bandwidth of 1, separate on either side of the threshold. The dots are observed values averaged in intervals of 50 inhabitants.
